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Execution of Persistent Suspicious Programedit
Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.) by looking at process lineage and command line usage.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 101 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule queryedit
/* userinit followed by explorer followed by early child process of explorer (unlikely to be launched interactively) within 1m */ sequence by host.id, user.name with maxspan=1m [process where event.type == "start" and process.name : "userinit.exe" and process.parent.name : "winlogon.exe"] [process where event.type == "start" and process.name : "explorer.exe"] [process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and /* add suspicious programs here */ process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "MSHTA.EXE", "RUNDLL32.EXE", "REGSVR32.EXE", "RegAsm.exe", "MSBuild.exe", "InstallUtil.exe") and /* add potential suspicious paths here */ process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "C:\\PerfLogs\\*", "C:\\Intel\\*") ]
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- ID: T1547
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
/* userinit followed by explorer followed by early child process of explorer (unlikely to be launched interactively) within 1m */ sequence by host.id, user.name with maxspan=1m [process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "userinit.exe" and process.parent.name : "winlogon.exe"] [process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "explorer.exe"] [process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and /* add suspicious programs here */ process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "MSHTA.EXE", "RUNDLL32.EXE", "REGSVR32.EXE", "RegAsm.exe", "MSBuild.exe", "InstallUtil.exe") and /* add potential suspicious paths here */ process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "C:\\PerfLogs\\*", "C:\\Intel\\*") ]
-
- Version 3 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only