IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShelledit
Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 2 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positivesedit
Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software.
Rule queryedit
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s [library where dll.name : "taskschd.dll" and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")] [network where process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.address in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Scheduled Task/Job
- ID: T1053
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 2 (7.12.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s [library where file.name: "taskschd.dll" and process.name: ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")] [network where process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.address in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
-