AWS EC2 Flow Log Deletionedit
Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 10 minutes
Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Log Auditing
Version: 4 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.9.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.2
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License
Potential false positivesedit
Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Flow log deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If a known behavior is causing false positives, it can be excluded from the rule.
Investigation guideedit
The AWS Filebeat module must be enabled to use this rule.
Rule queryedit
event.action:DeleteFlowLogs and event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.outcome:success
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 4 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.11.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.10.0 release)
-
- Formatting only